identities remain firmly embedded within the national-statist environments. Indeed, a simple exercise of projecting processes of national identity formation onto the EU can easily reveal that the latter lacks those 'pre-political elements', that is, the spiritual, social and cultural ties that bind the people together. 11 As the literature in the mid-1990s stated, the EU does not have a fully fledged European demos, at least not yet. 12 True, critics would raise doubts concerning the appropriateness of such an exercise, given the fact that the European Union is neither an extension nor the mirror image of national-statist jurisdictions, as well as its accuracy since the exercise underestimates the historical and political processes of collective identity formation. Union citizenship constitutes an additional tier of rights and protection which is not intended to replace national citizenship -a position that found concrete expression in the amended Article 17(1) at Amsterdam. 13 The European Court of Justice has by and large upheld the international law maxim that determination of nationality falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member
States, despite the anomalies that this creates in the filed of application of EC law and its exclusionary implications with respect to the rights of long term resident third country nationals.
In Micheletti, the ECJ confirmed that determination of nationality falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States, but it went on to add that this competence must be exercised with due regard to the requirements of Community law, 14 and in Kaur it stated that 'it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality. 15 This, essentially, means that persons who are legally recognised to be nationals of a Member state should be able to exercise their rights to free movement without impediments imposed by additional regulations adopted by other Member
States.
In Chen, the European Court of Justice criticised the restrictive impact of such additional conditions for the recognition of nationality of a Member State. It ruled that the United Kingdom had an obligation to recognise a minor's (Catherine Zhu) Union citizenship status even though her MS nationality had been acquired in order to secure a right of residence for her mother Chen, a third country national, in the United Kingdom. Since Catherine Zhu had legally acquired Irish nationality under the ius soli principle enshrined in the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956
and had both sickness insurance and sufficient resources, provided by her mother, the limitations and conditions referred to in Article 18 EC and laid down by Directive 90/364 had been met 13 Bull. EC 10-1992 I 8.9. The Amsterdam Treaty added the statement that 'Union citizenship shall complement national citizenship' to Article 8(1) EC (Article 17(1) on renumbering). 14 Owing to the foregoing reasons, scholars and commentators concluded that the institution of European citizenship was simply not enough to induce real institutional change. Its value was more symbolic and instrumental. After all, the enumeration of a set of citizen entitlements in the Treaty could not but enhance the European Union's social legitimacy. But this perspective underestimated the 'constructive potential' of Union citizenship and the extent to which it would penetrate national citizenship, thereby effecting incremental, but transformative, institutional change. 19 A rival, constructivist perspective did not hesitate to view European citizenship as a marker of a wider socio-political transformation. The latter was associated with a renewed focus on longstanding concerns about the maintenance of nationality as a proxy for defining political community; the changes effected by globalisation and the proper functioning of domestic institutions in an interdependent and highly complex world; the emergence of mutli-level governance and transnationalism; and the effects of the replacement of the ideal of national 16 homogeneity with multiplicity and diversity, on the one hand, and of conformity with reflexive identities and critical forms of belonging, on the other, for democracy and citizenship in the 21 st century. On this reading, the constraints of Union citizenship's existing political and legal structures were seen as neither fundamental flaws nor limits; instead, they were viewed as opportunities for institutional modification and for building a political community on purely political grounds. In other words, the main deficiency of the European Union, namely, the lack of a primordial substratum and/or cultural commonalities was, in the view of constructivists, its principal advantage and the main reason for its normative appeal. Form this point view, European citizenship constituted a unique experiment for stretching social and political bonds beyond national boundaries and for creating a political community in which diverse peoples become associates in a collective experience and institutional designers. Europe could thus become the setting for the more ambitious transition to a post-national tableau and the prototype for cosmopolitan experimentation on a global scale.
III COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AND THE POSTNATIONAL CONDITION
The European Union is a unique, experimental political arrangement. Born out of historical conflict and the pressing need to overcome the destructive tendencies of nationalism, the European Union represents a post-Westphalian order which can function effectively without the support of a settled institutional structure and a concrete, shared finalite. Indeed, a key difference between the EU and national polities is that the former is, without a doubt, a community of communities. Endowed with equal status and an equal opportunity to shape its institutional configuration and further evolution, the Member States are entangled in an ongoing project of political experimentation which entails as much interdependence and a shared quest for improved institutional arrangements as contestations, collisions and strife. Owing to EU membership, the Having a cosmopolitan outlook thus becomes a desirable attitude and a citizenly obligation. It accurately reflects the emergence of a 'globally oriented national citizenship' 30 -not of a 'global citizenship'. As Parekh has observed, 'the "we" that constitutes and defines a political community is expanding to encompass those hitherto perceived as "they", and the moral gap between general duties and special duties, between those to human beings in general and to our fellow-citizens is beginning to narrow'. 31 The distinguishing characteristic of this approach is the reconfiguration of cosmopolitanism from a nation-state transcending phenomenon to a nationstate sustaining discourse. By making cosmopolitanism a part of the project of good citizenship, the nation-state remains the primary actor and the main locus of community.
If this reasoning is then applied to European citizenship, one could argue that the latter instils a cosmopolitan consciousness within national citizenship, without threatening to replace it.
Since European citizenship is derivative of and supplementary to national citizenship, individuals' belonging to particular political homes could be complemented with a cosmopolitan orientation and a desire to enter into associative relations with other EC nationals. But if one examines more closely the conception of European citizenship as a form of (moral) cosmopolitan citizenship, (s)he will discern that it is compatible not only with liberal nationalist assumptions, but also with the seemingly antithetical, minimalist approaches to European citizenship discussed 
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Linklater has articulated a weaker form of political cosmopolitanism. This cosmopolitan perspective recommends that citizens are committed to pursuing free dialogue with others, refrain from engaging in exploitative practices and treat all human beings with compassion and care.
Although the realisation of such a cosmopolitan citizenship does not depend on the formation of a post-national political community, Linklater, nevertheless, believes that his dialogue-orientated cosmopolitan citizenship is both weighty and political. 37 He argues that the EU offers much hope for a cosmopolitan citizenship if only because it is characterised by the abandonment of the traditional monistic conception of sovereignty, flexibility in its orientations, attentiveness to the demands of heterogeneous publics, more inclusive membership and less controlling operations.
As Linklater has remarked, 'Western Europe is the most promising site for a remarkable experiment in creating political systems which no longer weld sovereignty, territoriality, 35 See also Held, which agency bears the main responsibility for honouring and enforcing these obligations; and ii) why the cultivation of a sense of responsibility for the planet and its inhabitants and of a cosmopolitan ethos of solidarity and concern about human rights violations cannot be accommodated within the setting of a bounded democratic citizenship. After all, these commitments are essentially imperfect obligations.
Delanty's idea of civic cosmopolitanism bears a family resemblance to Linklater's cosmopolitanism, since it is 'rooted in a civic concept of the nation'. 39 Civic cosmopolitanism is thus conceived of as a middle ground between the (false) universality of liberalism and the particularist orientation of communitarianism. By providing space for both the polis (i.e., the community) and cosmos (the world) and an institutional framework for multileveled governance beyond the nation-state, the European Union is viewed to be a concrete manifestation of civic cosmopolitanism. This is because the EU neither requires the transcendence of the nation-state paradigm nor anticipates the formation of a world community. had not been anticipated. This is the main focus of the discussion in the subsequent section.
IV THE ART OF THE IMPOSSIBLE
In the past, citizenship denoted the relationship between the individual and the territorial nation- True, this process is riddled with fundamental ambiguities, contradictions, and tensions.
The opposing dynamics between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism have not only shaped the development of Community's discourse and policy on citizenship, but are also present within the crystallised institution of Union Citizenship. The restrictive personal scope of Union citizenship, for instance, is a reflection of intergovernmentalism. Equally, the weakening of traditional state prerogatives with regard to the entry and residence of economically active or economically self-sufficient Community nationals has been accompanied by the reinforcement of the dichotomy of citizens and 'aliens', be they resident third country nationals, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. 46 Processes of equalisation thus co-exist with processes of exclusion, and the relativisation of the Member States' borders is accompanied by the reinforcement of the external frontiers of the Union and the relocation of migration controls in third countries.
Although it is only right and proper that we should be reminded of this, it is difficult not to be impressed by the extent to which Community rights' jurisprudence has transformed immigration 44 See the Commission's Report on Citizenship of the Union, COM (93) The notion of 'immigrant' or 'temporary guest' has been replaced by that of Union citizen. 48 Accordingly, the presence in the territory of a host Member State (MS) of Community workers, work-seekers, establishers, service-providers and tourists, as potential recipients of services, is no longer a matter of state toleration and consent. It is, instead, an issue of exercising fundamental rights. In the pre-Maastricht era, formal rights of free movement and residence were also conferred on the economically independent, retired persons, students and their families, provided that they have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host state and are covered by health insurance. 49 In the post-Maastricht era, the institution of Union citizenship raised citizens' expectations 50 and created a normative template for calling into question the link between citizen status and economic activity or self-sufficiency. burden on the host MS.
Grzelczyk gave the Court the opportunity to advance the normative debate on the meaning and implications of Union citizenship, by calling into question the link between economic activity and residence in certain circumstances (i.e., temporary economic difficulties).
This gave 'a strong appearance of case law moving away from the grant of particular rights to particular groups of (economic) actors and instead embracing a powerful mission of protection of individual rights'. 62 By so doing, it initiated a wider learning process, since students who face temporary economic difficulties would have to be seen as associates and 'belongers' to the host community, rather than as strangers and a problem. This was re-affirmed in the Bidar case in
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. 63 In Bidar, the Court departed from earlier case law which excluded students from the grant social assistance, by ruling that, as Union citizens, students who have demonstrated 'a certain degree of integration into the society of the host state' can claim maintenance grants. But the Member States are also entitled to ensure that 'the grant of assistance does not become an unreasonable burden'. Even though the requirement of demonstrating 'a certain degree of integration' is not sufficiently clear, the Court has, nevertheless, indicated that a reasonable cease to apply, thereby enabling former students to stay on in the host state and to receive social security entitlements on the same basis as nationals (Articles 7 and 8(4) generates an entitlement to non-discrimination. Departing from existing case law, the Court thus ruled in Trojani that a lawfully resident non active economic actor is entitled to a social assistance benefit on the basis of Article 12 EC, 66 whereas in Collins, the absence of a genuine link between a jobseeker and the employment market of the host state invalidates an entitlement to a jobseeker's allowance. 67 In both cases, however, the principle of proportionality must be respected and the application of a residence requirement is open to judicial review.
In Baumbast, the Court went beyond the predictive confines of settled law in order to bring about institutional change. It did not only derive a new right of residence for a parent who is the primary carer of a child studying in a host MS (Article 12 of Council Reg. 1612/68), but it also ruled that Article 18(1) EC has created directly effective rights enforceable in national courts. 68 Although the German and UK Governments submitted that Article 18 (1) did not create a directly effective right because it was not intended to be a free-standing provision, the ECJ relied on the normative weight of Union citizenship, and ruled that:
'…As regards, in particular, the right to reside within the territory of the Member States under Article failure to comply with such formalities can never constitute a ground for deportation. As long as the beneficiaries of the right of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host MS they should not be expelled. If they have to rely on such assistance, the MS concerned has to take into account a number of considerations, such as the temporary nature of their difficulties, the duration of their residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted before deciding to adopt an expulsion measure. And it is explicitly stated that an expulsion measure should not be adopted against workers, self-employed persons or job-seekers, who can provide evidence that they actively seek employment and that they have a genuine change of being engaged, save on grounds of public policy or public security.
Member states may restrict the freedoms of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members on the basis of the above mentioned grounds, but as the ECJ has consistently stated, the latter must be strictly interpreted and comply with the principle of August 1997 on the grounds that it contravened the Community directives on the movement and residence and the principle of respect for family life, which is protected by Community law. Drawing on Carpenter, the ECJ emphasised the importance of ensuring protection of the family life of Community nationals. It ruled that a number of state practices, such as sending back to the border third country national spouses of Community nationals who do not possess the necessary entry documents (i.e., an identity document or visa), denying them a residence permit or ordering an expulsion order on the grounds that they were 'illegal' entrants or residents, are disproportionate and unlawful under Community law.
Measures taken on these grounds, that is, decisions denying leave to enter or ordering expulsion, shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, which must constitute 'a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society'. 79 The same assessment must take place with respect to third country nationals who are spouses of Community nationals, for whom alerts have entered European citizenship is also a conceptual challenge; that is, it has the capacity to change our understanding of citizenship and membership with a view to opening up new forms of political community. As we shall see below, Union citizenship holds out the promise of a constructive approach to citizenship which is more respectful of 'difference' and inclusive than the nationality model of citizenship.
B European citizenship: Writing the future
The establishment of European Union citizenship has enriched the political imagination by bringing forth an alternative conception of community; namely, one that is based neither on ascriptive membership nor on the liberal notion of consent. Europe's deep diversity and the contestation surrounding its shape and future lead us to view the EU as community that is held together by the concern and willingness of its various constituent units to participate in the collective shaping of the process of European integration and in institutional design. Such a conception of community does not only allow for disagreements and conflicts, but also shows that a sense of community can be created and sustained even though its members have different views about its nature and future.
In such a constructed and flexible community, European citizenship cannot be an institutional reflection of pre-existing, pre-political views about community membership and identity. Instead, it becomes a catalyst for the formation of a civic and reflexive European identity. As Preuss has remarked, 'citizenship does not presuppose the community of which the citizen is a member, but creates this very community'. 94 True, this perspective contradicts liberal nationalist perspectives by refusing to make the existence of a fully fledged, unified and bounded
European demos the precondition of European democracy and citizenship. But its main advantage is that it accurately reflects the constructed nature of the European polity. European citizenship thus becomes a project to be realised as the 'grand conversation' about the political restructuring of Europe goes on.
Because European citizenship is seen as an issue of institutional design, it carries within it an ethical responsibility; the responsibility to be nourished by institutions, practices, rules and ideas embodying a commitment to social transformation, democratic reform and respect for the Other. In 1996 I used the term constructive citizenship in order to denote not only the constructed (as opposed to natural and objective) nature of European citizenship, but also its potential for new transformative politics beyond the nation-state. 95 One crucial feature of constructive citizenship is that it postulates a vision of inclusion and equal democratic participation in a community where difference is valued and appreciated -and not simply tolerated. Such a conception of citizenship embodies a novel and more flexible conception of demos: it separates the demos from ethnic and cultural commonalities and reconfigures it as a political process of participatory enactment. It is widely acknowledged that the European demos in formation can not be built on some form of tangible homogeneity among the European peoples or on mythical foundations. 96 Nor does it require some form of cultural conformity or a hegemonically imposed universalism as a requirement for admission. Rather, it can only be conceived of as a genuinely heterogeneous absorb other identifications and allegiances, but is committed to 'the pursuit of multiple connections of respect across persisting differences'.
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This has implications for citizenship theory and practice. Although nationality has been taken to be a proxy for political community, the free movement provisions of the Treaty, coupled with the grant of local electoral rights to Community nationals in the state of their residence, have severed the link between nationality and the enjoyment of equality of treatment and rights.
Interestingly, the boundaries of national citizenship have not been relaxed 'from within' as to allow Community nationals to obtain citizenship via naturalisation, but they have been 'ruptured from outside' through the conferral of rights which are enforceable before national courts. Such developments have made domicile a more suitable criterion for membership in the European demos, than possession, or acquisition, of Member State nationality.
Domicile is based on ascertaining certain factual conditions from which an intention to make a particular territory the hub of one's interests and life can be deduced. As such, it is considerably less exclusionary than the nationality principle, since it would include as participants and respected members all those who have made a particular territory their home, the centre of their economic life, pay taxes, and are affected by state policies, and participate in a whole web of social interactions which undoubtedly generate expectations. If EU citizenship were conditioned on domicile, third country nationals, who have been residing on a lawful and permanent basis in the territories of the EU for five years, would have been transformed into European citizens. Several institutional actors have campaigned long and hard for such a reform, arguing that EU citizenship needs to be disentangled from state nationality and affirm itself as a true supranational institution, if it is not to be robbed of democratic quality and substance.
Despite the inclusionary effects and normative appeal of this reform, it is true that national executives see it as an anathema. This owes much to the resilience of nationalism which and activate their link with a normative system (i.e., the human rights regime or the EU) when their link with another normative system either is blocked or fails to yield a desirable outcome.
Individuals are thus no longer locked within a single, unified and finite network commanding unqualified allegiance. Rather, they are members of and participants in multiple associative networks to which rights and obligations are attached. In addition, citizens are not only embedded within webs of interactions and reciprocal relations among other units, persons, and groups exhibiting mutual concern about the future of social co-operation, but their identities are also produced within such webs of social relationships.
The principle of domicile can best embody the conception of citizenship as a network good. Whereas national citizenship denotes formal membership to a nation state to which a person owes allegiance, domicile indicates the various connections and bonds of association that a person has with a political community and its legal system from which rights and obligations flow. In this respect, domicile could either reflect the special connection that one has with the country in which (s)he has his/her permanent home or the connection one has with a country by virtue of his/her birth within its jurisdiction or of his/her association with a person on whom (s)he is dependent. As already noted, national citizenship has traditionally disregarded or downplayed the connections that resident non-nationals may have with a juridicopolitical system, even though they are subject to its laws and as much a part of the public as birthright citizens. By putting emphasis on the national cum political nature of citizenship, it is thus ill equipped to capture the complexity of membership, which results in individuals taking on an identity within a community by virtue of the social facts of living, working and interacting there, and the endemic variegation of human interaction. Yet the latter facts can no longer be disregarded in the 21 st century. As earlier noted, a political community that is ostensibly committed to those ideals must ensure that all those consistently and permanently affected by laws and rules have a say in the political process of decision-making and are recognised as full and equal members. And although any democratic community has a legitimate interest in limiting political participation to persons who are concerned about its future and are committed to its welfare, residence, participation in the web of socio-economic interactions for an indefinite period of time and contribution, be it monetary or otherwise, are good evidence of this sort of commitment. In this respect, artificial distinctions based on the political formalities of membership which result in widespread exclusion from political participation tend to corrode the democratic credentials of political cultures.
V. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the importance of embracing a process-based and reflective orientation to the study of European Union citizenship. Instead of seeking to establish, and to defend, the primacy of a specific level of citizenship, thereby importing either consciously or unconsciously an ideological bias, it is much more fruitful to start from the assumption that European Union and national citizenships are interdependent and to examine their interaction and gradual transformation. In so doing, we do not have to deny that national attachments are 
